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different from its predecessors, particularly since it had the benefit
of two years of planning.
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along.
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual
changing of the guard in leadership,
so to speak, as well as a
3
downsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to the
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with
a growing number of Board seats being occupied by junior law
I. INTRODUCTION
professors. 6
Another major development is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution
to this larger
a ten-acre parcel of land located in Central Florida. 7 Purchased by
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to 5The Living Justice Center
economics and law: the Coase Theorem. Specifically, we present a
and the LatCrit Community Campus. 8 The physical facility serves
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version”
as a means “to level the playing field and 6give LatCrit activists a
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In brief, what if the
fighting chance to be heard.” 9 The space is intended
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in
to serve as the hub of their educational, research,
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts? 7 Or, as
independent physical base has become critical as
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s
universities and law schools increasingly are even less
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed, 8 would they still end
3 A.W.
Naming
and
Tucker,
Launching
A Two-Person
a New Discourse
Dilemma: The
of Critical
Prisoner’s
Legal
Dilemma
Scholarship,
(1950), as
2
H
ARV . LATINO
L. REV
(1997). Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14
reprinted
in Philip
D.. 1Straffin,
-YEAR
C. M
ATHEMATICS
J. 228Conferences,
(1983).
also
LatCrit
Biennial
LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
TWOSee
4 Latina
CRITICAL
LEGAL
& Latino
THEORY
Critical
, INC.,Legal
http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcritTheory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit
Conference
biennial-conferences/
Program (last
Schedule
visited (and
July 5,Related
2013) (providing
Events), (2013),
a list of available
the previous
at
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some
m_FinalR.pdf.
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H.
webpage).
1, 1–44
(1960). George
Coase,
The Problem
of Social
Cost, 3 aJ.L.
& ECON.body
Additionally,
LatCrit
has developed
substantial
of scholarship
from
Stigler, other
however,
was the symposia:
economistinter
who alia
first the
presented
the idea
now known
several
stand-alone
South-North
Exchange,
the
EORGE J. STIGLER
, THE THEORY
OF PRICE
113
as
the Space
Coase Series,
Theorem.
Study
the G
International
and Comparative
Colloquia.
LatCrit
ATCed.
RIT:1966).
LATCGeorge
RIT: LATINA
& stated
LATINOCoase’s
CRITICAL
EGAL
THEORY,
(MacMillan,
Stigler
idea Las
a “theorem”
Symposia, L3d
INC.,coined
http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/
(last
visited
and
the term “Coase Theorem.” Id.
generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE , PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor
July6 5,See
2014).
6 These
Professors
Marc-Tizoc
González,
AndreaofFreeman,
and
Books
1993) include
(providing
an overview
and history
of the origins
the dilemma);
César
Cuahtémoc
García Hernández.
SeeofAbout
LatCrit, supra
note 21,
3 (listing
see also
F. E. Guerra-Pujol,
The Parable
the Prisoners,
5–9 (June
2013)
the
professorsGuerra-Pujol,
on the LatCrit
of Directors
their respective
law
[hereinafter
TheBoard
Parable
of the and
Prisoners]
(unpublished
schools).
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL (explaining
LEGAL THEORY
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593,
the,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/
(last visited July 5, 2014).
prisoner’s
parable).
7 Id.
8
8 See
9
Id. infra Part I.B.
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up defecting?
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that few scholars have
explored the possible relation between the Coase Theorem and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. One important exception is Wayne Eastman,
a professor at Rutgers Business School, who established a formal
identity between the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 9
3
Instead of following Eastman’s approach (i.e., relating the Coase
Theorem to the Prisoner’s Dilemma), 10 we do the opposite. We
relate the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Coase Theorem by
I. INTRODUCTION
constructing a pure Coasean
version of the dilemma.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Part II
Building
the main by
theme
of this year’s
LatCrit
provides
someuponbackground
presenting
the standard
Conference, Resistance
Rising: Dilemma
Theorizing
and Building
Crossformulations
of the Prisoner’s
in numerical
as well
as
4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger
Sector Movements,
algebraic
terms. Next,
Part III presents our thought-experiment:
critical
challenges
the Theorem,
dominant we
paradigms
in
orderconversation)
to test the true
value of one
the of
Coase
considerin
a
5 Specifically, we present a
economics
and law:
the Coase
Theorem.
“pure
Coasean
version”
of the
Prisoner’s
Dilemma in which
thought-experiment,
we shalland
calltransactions
the “pure Coasean
version”
property
rights are what
well-defined
costs are
zero
6 In brief, what if the
of the
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
game.
(i.e.,
thefamous
prisoners
are allowed
to openly
communicate
and bargain
prisoners with
in each
this other).
game-theory
allowedof (i)
to
directly
Part IV parable
explores were
the effects
communicate (ii)
andexponential
bargain with
each otherand
instead
of being held
in
uncertainty,
discounting,
(iii) elasticity
on the
separate cells,
in the standard
version version
of the dilemma?
Would
behavior
of theasprisoners
in the Coasean
of the dilemma.
our prisoners
strike
mutually-beneficial
and (and
collectively-optimal
Part
V considers
thea role
of the prosecutor
third parties,
7 Or, as
Coasean bargain,
as the Dilemma
Coase Theorem
predicts?
generally)
in the Prisoner’s
and the overall
complexity
of
predicted
in Lastly,
the standard
the which
Prisoner’s
the
dilemma.
Part VI one-shot
identifies version
conditionsof under
the
8 would they still end
Dilemma inDilemma
which bargaining
is not
allowed,
Prisoner’s
refutes the
Coase
Theorem,
while Part VII
concludes.
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as
II. STANDARD VERSIONS OF THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 By
way&ofLatino
background,
we begin
thisInc.,
paper
by Biennial
presenting
the
Latina
Critical Legal
Theory,
2013
LatCrit
Conference or
Program
Schedule
(and Related
Events),
(2013), Dilemma
available at
standard
“canonical”
formulation
of the
Prisoner’s
–
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
by
far the most famous story or parable in all of game theory –
m_FinalR.pdf.
both
in numerical and algebraic form. 11 Readers who are already
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H.
familiar
the of
details
the 3Prisoner’s
Dilemma
skip
this
. 1, 1–44may
(1960).
George
Coase, Thewith
Problem
SocialofCost,
J.L. & ECON
part
and
proceed
to
Part
III.
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known
as the Coase Theorem. G EORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George
Stigler stated
Coase’s idea as a “theorem”
A. Numerical
Form
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id.
6 See generally W ILLIAM POUNDSTONE , PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor
of history
the dilemma
is of
attributed
to
BooksThe
1993)original
(providingformulation
an overview and
of the origins
the dilemma);
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished
9 See Wayne (on
Eastman,fileHow Coasean
Bargaining
a Prisoners’
manuscript)
with
author), Entails
available
at
a formal
Dilemma,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 89, 95–98 (1964) (establishing
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593,
(explaining
the
identity
between
the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma).
prisoner’s
parable).
10Id.
7
Id. at 90 n.7.
11See
8
Seeinfra
sources
Partcited
I.B.supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Professor from
different
Albert
itsTucker,
predecessors,
a mathematician
particularlyatsince
Princeton
it had University,
the benefit
who
of
twopresented
years of planning.
the parable of the prisoners during a guest lecture
Professor
at Stanford
Like the University
shift in conference
in May scheduling,
1950. 12 Specifically,
other changes
have
Tuckerplace
posedwithin
the following
hypothetical
scenarioconcerted
in a one-page
taken
the LatCrit
entity, including
efforts
mimeograph
A of
Two-Person
Dilemma In
that
he prepared
for
to
continue atitled
process
institutionalization.
recent
years, there
his guest
has
been lecture:
a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and
Two
men,
charged
a joint violation
of law,isare
held along.
ensure
that
the
baton with
of outsider
jurisprudence
passed
separately
the police. Each
told thatincluding a gradual
Internally,
the byorganization
has isshifted,
(1) if of
onethe
confesses
the other does
not,speak,
the former
willasbe a
changing
guard and
in leadership,
so to
as well
given
reward of one unit
the latter
will2008
be fined
downsizing
in a administration.
Forand
example,
from
to two
the
present, units,
the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with
(2) if both
confess,
each will
be fined
unit. by junior law
a growing
number
of Board
seats
beingone
occupied
At the6 same time each has reason to believe that
professors.
Another
major
development
(3) if neither
confesses
both willisgoLatCrit’s
clear. 13 acquisition of a
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano
In addition,
Professor
Tucker
included
the“Camp
following
“payoff
(Spanish
for “Camp
Healthy,”
or more
literally,
Sanity”),
is
table”
in his
mimeo
illustrate
parable: Florida. 7 Purchased by
a
ten-acre
parcel
of to
land
located his
in Central
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The Living Justice Center
and the LatCrit Community Campus. 8 The physical facility serves
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a
fighting chance to be heard.” 9 The space is intended
to serve as the hub of their educational, research,
14
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an
Although Professor Tucker does not use the terms “Prisoner’s
independent physical base has become critical as
Dilemma” or “Prisoners’ Dilemma” in his original mimeo, he does
universities and law schools increasingly are even less
refer to the prisoners’ predicament as “a two-person dilemma” in
the title of the mimeo. 15 More importantly, in Tucker’s original
telling of his tale, we see all the elements associated with the
Naming and
Launching
New Discourse
of Critical
16
Legal Scholarship, 2
standard
version
of thea Prisoner’s
Dilemma:
HARV . LATINO L. REV . 1 (1997).
-Two Suspects: I and II are held in separate rooms and thus
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
unable
or bargain with each other;
CRITICALtoLcommunicate
EGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-Two Choices: (last
confess
orJuly
not 5,
confess;
biennial-conferences/
visited
2013) (providing a list of the previous
conferences,
and providing
direct links
view symposia
articles
for some
-Interdependent
Payoffs:
the topayoffs
associated
with
each
years (found
following
the respective
year’s
to its corresponding
choice
dependbyupon
the choices
made by
bothlink
suspects;
webpage).
-Payoff Table: a visual presentation of the parable, or stated
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
formally,
a reduction
the dilemma
to “normal
form.” Exchange, the
several other
stand-aloneofsymposia:
inter alia
the South-North
published
account and
of Comparative
the Prisoner’s
Dilemma,
StudyThe
Spacefirst
Series,
the International
Colloquia.
LatCrit
ATCRITnot
: LATappear
CRIT: LATINA
LATINO years
CRITICALlater,
LEGALwhen
THEORY
Symposia,
however, Ldoes
until &several
R.,
IDuncan
NC.,
http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/
(last gamevisited
Luce and Howard Raiffa’s published their classic
July 5, 2014).
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
12 Cuahtémoc
SYLVIA NASAR
, A Hernández.
BEAUTIFUL See
MIND
: A BLatCrit,
IOGRAPHY
OF J
OHN 3F(listing
ORBES
César
García
About
supra
note
NASHprofessors
, JR. 118 (1998);
, supra
6 at, 117–18.
the
on thePOUNDSTONE
LatCrit Board
of note
Directors
and their respective law
13 See Tucker, supra note 3 (presenting the parable of the prisoner).
schools).
14 Tucker,
7
Campo supra
Sano, note
LATC3.RIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC,15http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/
Id.
(last visited July 5, 2014).
16Id.
8
See id. (presenting all of the essential elements of the standard versions
9 Id.
of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma model).
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theory treatise, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical
Survey: 17
The following interpretation [of a two-person, non-zerosum game], known as the prisoner’s dilemma, is popular:
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The
3
district attorney is certain that they are guilty of a
specific crime, but does not have adequate evidence to
convict them at trial. He points out to each prisoner that
I. INTRODUCTION
each has two alternatives:
to confess to the crime the
police are sure that they have done, or not to confess. If
Building
main
of this
year’sstates
LatCrit
they both upon
do not the
confess,
thentheme
the district
attorney
Conference,
Theorizing
and Building
Crosshe will Resistance
book themRising:
on some
very minor
trumped-up
Sector
Movements,
(i.e.,and
ourillegal
contribution
to this
larger
charge
such as4 this
pettypaper
larceny
possession
of a
critical
conversation)
of the
dominant
paradigms
weapon,
and theychallenges
will both one
receive
minor
punishment;
if in
5 Specifically, we present a
economics
and law:
the they
Coasewill
Theorem.
they both
confess
both be
prosecuted, but he
thought-experiment,
“puresentence;
Coasean but
version”
will recommendwhat
less we
thanshall
the call
mostthe
severe
6 In brief, what if the
of the
Prisoner’s
game.
if famous
one confesses
andDilemma
the other
does
not, then the
prisoners
in will
this receive
game-theory
allowed to
confessor
lenient parable
treatmentwere
for turning
communicate
and bargain
with the
eachlatter
other will
instead
being
held in
state’s evidence
whereas
get of
“the
book”
separate
cells,at as
in18the standard version of the dilemma? Would
slapped
him.
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal
as
Coasean
bargain, Luce
as the
Theorem the
predicts?
In addition,
and Coase
Raiffa express
payoffs7 ofOr,their
predicted in
the in
standard
one-shot
version
of the ofPrisoner’s
prisoners’
parable
numerical
form (i.e.,
in terms
years in
would they
still end
Dilemmainina which
is not
allowed,
prison)
payoff bargaining
table, stating
that
“the 8strategic
problem”
in
this particular parable “might reduce to” the following set of
payoffs:

3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit
Conference Program Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf.
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known
19
as the Coase Theorem. G EORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem”
It is the
worth
that Luce
and coined
term noting
“Coase Theorem.”
Id. and Raiffa specifically included
6 See generally
ILLIAM POUNDSTONE
, PRISONER
’S DILEMMA
(Anchor
Professor
Tucker’sWstrategic
game and
their own
corresponding
Books 1993)
(providing
an overview
historyto
of the
origins of theNon-Zerodilemma);
payoff
matrix
in the
chapter and
devoted
“Two-Person
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
17
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, G AMES (explaining
AND DECISIONS
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593,
the:
INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL SURVEY (Dover Publications 2012) (1957).
prisoner’s
parable).
18Id.
7
Id. at 95.
19See
8
Id. infra Part I.B.
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baton of the
outsider
jurisprudence
person model
game; there has
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to speak,
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In addition, Luce and Raiffa attribute this standard
interpretation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to A.W. Tucker and also
note that this example “has received considerable attention by
game theorists.” 23 That this particular parable was already
“popular” by the mid-1950s – and sufficiently well-known among
mathematicians to be included in Luce and Raiffa’s treatise on
3
game theory – is itself telling. But why did this parable become so
popular so quickly? One possible reason is the realism of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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different from its predecessors, particularly since it had the benefit
of two years of planning.
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along.
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a
downsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to the
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with
a growing number of Board seats being occupied by junior26law
professors. 6
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yields P (the punishment for mutual defection). By assumption P >
S, so it pays to defect if the other player defects. Thus, no matter
what the other player does, it pays to defect. But, if both defect,
both get P rather than the larger value of R that both could have
gotten had both cooperated. Hence, the dilemma.
With two individuals destined to never meet again, the only
3
strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect
always despite the seeming paradoxical outcome that both do
worse than they could have had they cooperated. 31
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important respect: the ability, or lack thereof, of the parties to
settle their differences through bilateral negotiations or Coasean
bargaining. That is, the most salient distinction between the
hypothetical worlds of the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is the ability to bargain. In the former case, the rancher
and the farmer are fully able to bargain with each other and
3
negotiate a mutually beneficial enforceable agreement. 38 In the
latter story, however, the prisoners have no such option; they are
held in separate cells and unable to talk, much less bargain with
NTRODUCTION
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as the Coase Theorem. G EORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113
38Coase, supra
5, atGeorge
2–15. Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem”
(MacMillan,
3d ed.note
1966).
LUCE the
& Rterm
AIFFA“Coase
, supraTheorem.”
note 17; Tucker,
supra note 3.
and39coined
Id.
40 Coase,
6
See generally
supra note
WILLIAM
5, at 2–15.
POUNDSTONE , PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor
41 Tucker,
supra note
Books
1993) (providing
an3.overview and history of the origins of the dilemma);
Eastman,
supra note 9. The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013)
see 42
also
F. E. Guerra-Pujol,
43 Id.
[hereinafter
Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished
44 See id. at 90
deliberately
that his proposition
manuscript)
(onn.7 (noting
file verywith
author),
available “relates
at
the
[Coase] Theorem to the [Prisoner’s] Dilemma, rather than
vice versa” and
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593,
(explaining
the
his
reasonsparable).
for electing to do so).
prisoner’s
45Id.
7
See Guerra-Pujol, Modelling, supra note 35 (providing a different game8 See infra
Part I.B.
theoretic
formulation
of the Coase Theorem).

1300
Vol. 47:4
1168

1300
Prisoner’s
47 JO HN
Dilemma
M ARS HALL
andL.
CoRase
EV .Theorem
1168

Vol. 1301
47:4

they stillfrom
different
defect
its or
predecessors,
would theyparticularly
somehow since
decideit to
had
cooperate
the benefit
as
postulated
of
two yearsbyofthe
planning.
Coase Theorem?
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have
taken place
B. within
The Three
the Conditions
LatCrit entity,
of theincluding
Coase Theorem
concerted efforts
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there
has been
Before
a growing
attempting
focus
to on
answer
how tothe
capitalize
above on
questions,
its critical
we niche,
shall
continue
first identify
cultivating
and review
the nextthegeneration
main conditions
of critical ofscholars,
the Coase
and
ensure
Theorem.
thatProfessor
the baton
Coase
of outsider
introduced
jurisprudence
the counterintuitive
is passed along.
idea
Internally,
now known the
as the
organization
“Coase Theorem”
has shifted,
with aincluding
memorable
a gradual
parable
46 in
Theleadership,
rancher-farmer
parable,ashowever,
changing
about cattle
of trespass.
the guard
so to speak,
well as is
a
really a story
joint interactions
involving
bargaining
downsizing
in about
administration.
For example,
from
2008 to and
the
property the
rights.
is, Coasewas
posed
a well-defined
reciprocal
present,
BoardThat
of Directors
intentionally
downsized,
with
problem
using
the example
cattlebeing
trespass
and then
imagined
a
growing
number
of Boardofseats
occupied
by junior
law
6 happen if the affected parties (i.e., the rancher and the
what would
professors.
Another
development
is LatCrit’s
acquisition
of 47
a
farmer)
could major
solve this
problem through
voluntary
bargaining.
(Ultimately,
thisforisthe
theorganization.
same question
we pose
aboutSano
the
physical
space
Thethat
property,
Campo
prisoners for
in the
Prisoner’s
Dilemma.)
observed
when (i)
(Spanish
“Camp
Healthy,”
or more Coase
literally,
“Campthat
Sanity”),
is
Purchased by
the
costs parcel
of transacting
are zero
(a standard
in
a
ten-acre
of land located
in Central
Florida. 7assumption
LatCrit
in 2011,
the property
space is home
The well-defined,
Living Justice
Center
economics)
and (ii)
rightsto are
“Coasean
8 The physical
serves
and
the LatCrit
bargaining”
(i.e.,Community
voluntaryCampus.
negotiations)
among facility
the affected
48 Although
this
as a means
“to levelan
theefficient
playingeconomic
field andoutcome.
give LatCrit
activists
a
parties
will produce
9 The
space
intended
economic
“theorem”
been
stated
in is
many
different ways over
fighting chance
to be has
heard.”
the years, 49 the necessary elements of the Coase theorem remain
constant:
(i) theasexistence
of aof reciprocal
conflict, (ii)
well-defined
to serve
the hub
their educational,
research,
property
rights,andand
(iii) zero
transactions
costs (i.e.,
advocacy
activism
to remedy
the imbalance
and no
50 Accordingly,
we shallHaving
now show
impediments
to bargaining).
deficiencies
of the current
legal system.
an how
our pure
Coasean physical
version of
the has
dilemma
satisfies
independent
base
become
criticalallasthree
standard
conditionsand
of the
Theorem.
universities
lawCoase
schools
increasingly are even less
1. Reciprocal Nature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2
foremost,
HARV .First
LATINOand
L. REV
. 1 (1997). we wish to point out the “reciprocal
51 of LatCrit
the prisoners’
in all versions
LATINA
the Prisoner’s
& LATINO
See also
Biennial plight
Conferences,
LATCRIT: of
nature”
CRITICAL LEGAL
THEORY
, Iaspect
NC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcritDilemma.
Although
this
of Coase’s work is often overlooked
biennial-conferences/
5, 2013) (providing
the previous
or
neglected in the(last
lawvisited
and July
economics
literature,a list
weofbelieve
it is
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some
Coase’s
most
original
and
counterintuitive
insight.
Consider,
for
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding
webpage).
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
46 Coase,
note 5, at
2–15. inter alia the South-North Exchange, the
several
othersupra
stand-alone
symposia:
47 Id.
Study
Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit
48 See Coase,
supra
: LAT
note
CRIT
5,: atLATINA
2–15 (noting
& LATINO
whenC“Coasean
RITICAL Lbargaining”
EGAL THEORY
will,
Symposia,
LATCRIT
Iproduce
NC.,
http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/
(last
visited
an efficient economic outcome). See also Ronald H. Coase,
The Federal
July
5, 2014).
Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25–30 (1959) (noting when
6 These
include Professors
Marc-Tizoc
González,
Freeman, and
“Coasean
bargaining”
will produce
an efficient
economicAndrea
outcome).
49 See
STEVEN García
G. MEDEMA
& RICHARD
O. ZERBE
, Thesupra
Coasenote
Theorem,
1
César
Cuahtémoc
Hernández.
See About
LatCrit,
3 (listing
ENCYCLOPEDIA
LAWBoard
AND of EDirectors
CONOMICSand
: Ttheir
HE
H
ISTORY
AND
THE professors
the
on the OF
LatCrit
respective
law
METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 837–38 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
schools).
7 Campo
Sano,
LAT2000)
CRIT: (providing
LATINA AND
ATINO CRITICAL
Gerrit
De Geest
eds.,
anLextensive
listing L
ofEGAL
someTHEORY
of the,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/
(last visited July 5, 2014).
various
statements of the Coase Theorem).
50Id.
8
Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15.
51Id.
9
Id. at 1–2.

130247:4
Vol.

Prisoner’s
47 JO HN
Dilemma
M ARS HALL
andL.
CoRase
EV .Theorem
1302

Vol.1301
1291
47:4

example, Coase’s parable of the rancher and the farmer. 52
According to Coase, it is a fallacy to think that the problem of
cattle trespass is caused solely by the rancher. 53 In reality, cattle
trespass (i.e., the risk of potential harm to the farmer’s crops) is a
joint problem. 54 Just as the rancher can reduce the risk of harm by
reducing the size of his herd or erecting a boundary fence, so too
3
can the farmer, either by planting cattle-resistant crops or by
putting up the fence himself. 55 Likewise, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
also presents a reciprocal problem insofar as the payoffs for both
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transaction cost setting, may act strategically and thus fail to
strike a mutually beneficial Coasean bargain. 63 Here, we shall
contribute to the literature on the Coase Theorem in two ways.
First, building on the work of Wayne Eastman, we shall consider
strategic behavior in the form of promises and threats and explain
why such strategic behavior might prevent the formation of
3
Coasean bargains between the prisoners—even when they are
allowed to communicate with each other. Next, building on the
work of John Nash, we shall consider the possibility of nonINTRODUCTION
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Coasean bargain, both prisoners will most likely end up confessing
– or “defecting” in the parlance of game theory – because defection
is the only Nash equilibrium in the standard one-shot version of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since the defection payoff is equal to P
(i.e., the “punishment” payoff for mutual defection), Prisoner 1’s
payoff is equal to P1, while Prisoner 2’s payoff is P2. In the
3
standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, P1 is equal
to P2, since the payoffs are symmetrical. Following convention, and
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agreement to cooperate will be enforced perfectly and costlessly?
This, in turn, raises a new question: does Coasean bargaining
solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma even when enforcement is costless
and perfect? Not necessarily, for the answer to our question now
depends on how far in the future such enforcement will occur.
B.

3

Exponential Discounting
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income, such that the future steam is “discounted” and then added
together, thus providing a lump-sum “present value” today of the
entire income stream.
Like the time value of money, there is also a time value of
time, so to speak. One way of measuring the magnitude of each
prisoner’s incentive to breach (i.e., the probability that either
3
prisoner will breach or defect), even with a Coasean bargain in
place, is by analyzing the role that time plays in his or her
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other hand, Prisoner 2 might be far less responsive even to large
changes in the payoffs, and therefore, his demand for liberty would
be inelastic.
The most important determinant of the price elasticity of
demand is the availability of substitutes for the good in question. 85
Generally speaking, the elasticity of demand will be greater where
3
there are more substitutes for a particular good, and, likewise, the
elasticity will be lower where there are fewer substitutes. 86 In the
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prisoner (i.e., e = 1), and is far less responsive to such changes
than Prisoner 1 (i.e., e1 > 10). We would thus expect Prisoner 2 to
be highly unresponsive to the prosecutor’s strategic offer of
leniency in exchange for his confession.
Therefore, whether Prisoner 2 decides to defect or to
cooperate will, most likely, depend on his personal value system
3
and other relevant or applicable extra-strategic factors (e.g. age,
income, marital status, etc.). And yet, it is these factors that are
completely ignored or abstracted away in game theory. Put
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presence of this third party (i.e., his ability to offer lighter
sentences or more favorable payoffs to the prisoners) affect the
outcome of the game? Would the prisoners still defect in the oneshot version of the parable if the role of the prosecutor or other
third party were removed from the game?
Recall that the standard or “canonical” version of the
3
Prisoner’s Dilemma is classified as a “non-cooperative game”
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more variables and degrees of elasticities influence the triadic
relation among the prisoners and prosecutor, the more complex
their interaction becomes. Such a triadic and multivariable
interaction thus invites the use of a different approach, such as
complexity theory. 92 This, however, will be the subject of a future
paper.
3

VII. CONCLUSION
Before concluding, I.we INTRODUCTION
wish to say a few words about our
general approach to the question posed in the title of our paper as
upon theon main
theme
this to
year’s
LatCrit
well Building
as our emphasis
questions
(as ofopposed
answers)
or
Conference,
Resistance
Rising: Theorizing
andparaphrase
Building Stuart
Cross93 throughout
this paper. To
“known
unknowns”
4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger
Sector
Movements,
Firestein,
a neurobiologist
at Columbia University, our implicit
critical conversation)
challenges
one of theignorance
dominant(that
paradigms
in
premise
in these pages
is that communal
which we
5 Specifically, we present a
economics
and know)
law: the
Theorem.
do
not yet
is Coase
the main
fountain
of knowledge and
94 According
thought-experiment,
what
we shall call
the “pure
Coaseandiscovery
version”
to Firestein,
ignorance
promotes
discovery.
In brief,towhat
if the
of the famous
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
game.
because
it motivates
persons
engaged
in6 science
search
for
prisoners and
in this
this pursuit,
game-theory
parable
were
to
answers,
in turn,
leads to
newallowed
questions:
communicate is
andnot
bargain
with each other
of being held
“[ignorance]
an individual
lack instead
of information
but in
a
separate cells,
the standard
version
of the dilemma?
Would
communal
gap as
in in
knowledge
. . . This
is knowledgeable
ignorance,
our
prisoners
strike ainsightful
mutually-beneficial
collectively-optimal
perceptive
ignorance,
ignorance. and
It leads
us to frame
7 Or,
95 We
as
Coasean
bargain, the
as first
the step
Coase
Theorem
predicts?
better questions,
to getting
better
answers.”
predictedthis
in counterintuitive
the standard one-shot
version
the applies
Prisoner’s
believe
and critical
logicof also
to
8 would they still end
Dilemma inand
which
is social
not allowed,
economics
law,bargaining
and to the
sciences
generally. Rather
than restating what we already know (or think we know), as many
conventional legal scholars and economists tend to do, we make
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as
greater
progress when we pose new and non-trivial questions (i.e.,
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14
questions
toMwhich
we doJ.not
know the answers).
ATHEMATICS
228yet
(1983).
TWO-YEAR C.
4 In
this
paper,
then,
we
identified
the Inc.,
essential
of the
Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory,
2013 elements
Biennial LatCrit
Conference two-player
Program Schedule
(and Dilemma,
Related Events),
(2013), available
at
one-shot,
Prisoner’s
the simplest
and most
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
famous
of all models in game theory, and then presented a pure
m_FinalR.pdf.
Coasean
version of the dilemma, one in which the prisoners are
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H.
allowed
to
communicate
and
bargain
each
and not
just
. 1,other,
1–44 (1960).
George
Coase, The Problem
of Social
Cost,
3 J.L. with
& ECON
with
the
prosecutor.
We
found
that
even
when
the
prisoners
are
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known
STIGLERwith
, THE each
THEORY
OF Pthere
RICE 113
as the Coase
Theorem. G EORGE
allowed
to communicate
and J.
bargain
other,
is
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem”
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id.
692 See generally
, COMPLEXITY
: A ’G
TOUR (Anchor
(2009).
generallyMELANIE
WILLIAMMITCHELL
POUNDSTONE
, PRISONER
S UIDED
DILEMMA
For applications
to law, an
seeoverview
Orlando I.
Martínez-García,
The Person
Law,
Books
1993) (providing
and
history of the origins
of theindilemma);
the Number
in Guerra-Pujol,
Math, 18 AM. The
U. J.Parable
OF GENDER
SOC. POL’Y
L. 50321,
(2010).
see
also F. E.
of the Prisoners,
5–9&(June
2013)
93 Moran Cerf,
Known Unknowns,
336 SCI
(reviewing
STUART
[hereinafter
Guerra-Pujol,
The Parable
of. 1382
the (2012)
Prisoners]
(unpublished
FIRESTEIN, IGNORANCE
SCIENCEauthor),
(2012)).
manuscript)
(on : HOW
fileIT DRIVES
with
available
at
94 By “ignorance,” we follow Firestein in meaning “the (explaining
absence of fact,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593,
the
understanding,
insight, or clarity about something.” STUART FIRESTEIN,
prisoner’s parable).
7 Id.
: HOW IT DRIVES SCIENCE 6 (2012).
IGNORANCE
95See
8
Id. infra
at 7. Part I.B.

1318
Vol. 47:4
1168

1318
Prisoner’s
47 JO HN
Dilemma
M ARS HALL
andL.
CoRase
EV .Theorem
1168

Vol. 1319
47:4

some positive
different
from its
probability
predecessors,
that particularly
they might since
not strike
it had the
a Coasean
benefit
bargain.
of
two years
Furthermore,
of planning. we found that even if they are able to
negotiate
Like the
a mutually
shift in conference
beneficial scheduling,
agreement other
(e.g. through
changes have
nontaken
strategic
place
bargaining),
within thethere
LatCrit
is also
entity,
some
including
positive concerted
probabilityefforts
that
to
they
continue
could still
a process
breachof such
institutionalization.
an agreement and
In recent
end up
years,
defecting,
there
has
contrary
been to
a growing
what thefocus
Coase
on Theorem
how to capitalize
predicts.on
Inits
either
critical
case,
niche,
the
continue
probabilitycultivating
of defection
theisnext
a function
generation
of various
of critical
factors,
scholars,
including
and
ensure
such things
that theasbaton
uncertainty,
of outsider exponential
jurisprudencediscounting,
is passed along.
and
Internally,
elasticity. the organization has shifted, including a gradual
changing
This of
conclusion
the guard
– the
in leadership,
possibility ofso defection
to speak,in as
thewell
Coasean
as a
version of dilemma
downsizing
in administration.
– is theoretically
For example,
significantfrom
because
2008it all
to but
the
refutes
present,orthe
falsifies
Boardthe
of Directors
Coase Theorem.
was intentionally
It is also worth
downsized,
noting with
that
our
a growing
conclusion
number
is notofbased
Boardonseats
ad hoc
being
behavioral
occupiedorbypsychological
junior law
quirks of 6human behavior. Uncertainty, exponential discounting,
professors.
is LatCrit’s
acquisition
a
and Another
elasticity major
are all development
part of the standard
economics
toolkit ofand
physical
for standard
the organization.
The
property, of
Campo
Sano
are
basedspace
on the
rationality
assumption
economics.
(Spanish
“Camp Healthy,”
or more literally, “Camp
Sanity”),
is
The
mainfor
contribution
of the thought-experiment
presented
in this
7 Purchased
a ten-acre
of land
located
in Prisoner’s
Central Florida.
paper
– ourparcel
Coasean
version
of the
Dilemma
– is thatby
it
LatCrit
in 2011,
the space
is questions,
home to The
Justice
Center
poses many
deep and
difficult
and Living
this paper
is our
first
8 The
physical facility serves
and
the in
LatCrit
attempt
searchCommunity
of answers Campus.
… and new
questions.
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a
fighting chance to be heard.” 9 The space is intended
to serve as the hub of their educational, research,
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an
independent physical base has become critical as
universities and law schools increasingly are even less

Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2
HARV . LATINO L. REV . 1 (1997).
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcritbiennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding
webpage).
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC.,
http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/
(last
visited
July 5, 2014).
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law
schools).
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014).
8 Id.
9 Id.

